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Abstract. This paper aims at demonstrating how a first-order logic reasoning
system in combination with a large knowledge base can be understood as an ar-
tificial consciousness system. For this we review some aspects from the area of
philosophy of mind and in particular Baars’ Global Workspace Theory. This will
be applied to the reasoning system Hyper with ConceptNet as a knowledge base
within a scenario of commonsense and cognitive reasoning. Finally we demon-
strate that such a system is very well able to do conscious mind wandering.
Keywords: Cognitive science · philosophy of mind · commonsense reasoning ·
automated reasoning.
1 Introduction
Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is an old and still ongoing debate. The
question whether an AI system is able to understand in a conscious way what it is doing
was very prominently raised by Searle’s chinese room experiment [25]. This is based on
a symbol processing system, the Chinese room, which is a kind of production rule sys-
tem. There also is a thread of this discussion, using sub-symbolic arguments, by dealing
with artificial neural networks as discussed together with various other arguments in [7].
Embedding the discussion of AI systems and consciousness in a larger context, it
is worth noting that it is a topic since the mind-body problem raised by Descartes. He
postulated that mental process are properties of the mind only — the body has to be
considered separately. The discussion since Descartes has resulted in a constant change
of naturalistic (or physicalistic) and idealistic positions.
The naturalistic position received a lot of impetus by the successes of neuroscience
in connection with the ambition of artificial intelligence to model neural networks in
artificial systems. In this position the spiritual dimension of the human being is subor-
dinated to the physical dimension, the spiritual is derived from the physical, in short:
We are only a bunch of neurons [8] and our ego is only an illusion, as postulated by
Metzinger [20].
In contrast to this naturalistic view there is a long tradition of approaches which
aim at understanding consciousness by taking body and mind into account. These ap-
proaches can be summarized by the notion of panpsychism, which will be discussed in
Section 2.
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McDermott is commenting in [18], that AI researchers “tend to shy away from ques-
tions about consciousness....The last thing most serious researchers want is to be quoted
on the subject of computation and consciousness.” In this paper we aim at demon-
strating that an AI system, in our case Hyper [6], an automated reasoning system for
first-order logic, can be very well interpreted as a conscious system according to two
widely accepted theories of consciousness, namely the Information Integration Theory
of Tononi [28] and the the Global Workspace Theory (GWT) [2] of Baars. GWT, also
called Baars’ theater, is an approach to consciousness which is mainly motivated by
the need for handling the huge amount of knowledge in memory. The reasoning system
Hyper resembles this model in astonishing ways, without having been specifically de-
veloped that way. Its development was driven only by the need to be used in the area of
deep question answering [11,13].
The first part of the paper contains a general review of issues on consciousness: The
discussion around physicality and panpsychism is depicted in Section 2 and Section 3
focuses on information theoretic approaches to consciousness. The second part instanti-
ates these approaches by looking at the Hyper reasoner through the glasses of the GWT
(Section 4) and by introducing mind wandering with Hyper in Section 5.
2 Physicalism versus Panpsychism
In this section we discuss an approach to consciousness that allows us to attribute it
to artificial systems as well. We follow the argumentation of Patrick Spa¨t [26], who
introduced a so called gradual panpsychism, which is contrasted to physicalism. Spa¨t
argues against physicalism by stating that it cannot really clarify what the physical
is, although it claims that all phenomena of the world are based on purely physical
properties: If physicalism is based on the state of knowledge of contemporary physics,
the definition must inevitably be incomplete, since contemporary physics does not yet
provide a complete description of all phenomena occurring in the cosmos. In addition,
contemporary physics may prove to be wrong. Also reference to a future, complete
physics, which is equivalent to a “theory of everything”, is not helpful because it cannot
be specified further. According to Spa¨t, a physicalist resembles Baron Mu¨nchhausen,
who claims that he can pull himself out of a swamp by his own hair. For while the Baron
needs an external point of reference at which he finds support and by which he can pull
himself out, the physicalist needs his subjective perspective in order to have access to
the world at all. Since only phenomena that can be objectively verified and formulated
in the language of mathematics are to flow into the scientific description of reality, the
subjective perspective is faded out.
There are facts that go beyond the explanatory models of physicalism. In order
to know what conscious experiences are and how they feel, a subjective, i.e. “inner”
perspective of experience is required. This is what Thomas Nagel’s question aims at:
What is it like to be a bat? [22] The physicalist can cite all kinds of physical facts about
the bat, but she cannot take its perspective or experience. She cannot take it because she
is not a bat and does not have the body she needs to experience the bat’s consciousness.
However, as a result of Descartes’ separation of body and mind (cogito, ergo sum), the
body was isolated from the mind and regarded as an object. This dualistic division does
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not take into account the fact that one experiences one’s environment through and with
one’s body. The body is therefore not an “illusion” of the brain. Rather, the brain needs
the body in order to experience its environment. Maurice Merleau-Ponty describes the
conscious experience and physical “immersion” in the outside world using a footballer
who does not perceive the ball, the boundaries of the playing field and the goal as
representational or analytical — rather, the football field is “present as the immanent
target of his practical intention” by actively acting in the football field [19]. When we
communicate with other people, we can — or we try to — read from their gestures
and facial expressions how they are doing. Consciousness is entangled with the body
and our experience shows that we can approach the consciousness of other beings, but
this becomes more and more difficult the further we genetically distance ourselves from
each other (see the bat above).
Spa¨t introduced the concept of “gradual panpsychism” by assuming a fundamental
connection between mind and matter. He is arguing that a specificity of mind goes hand
in hand with the complexity of matter or organisms. He assumes a very simple rudimen-
tary form of mentality, namely mind as an ability to process information. It is based on
Bateson’s concept of information: A “bit” of information is definable as a difference
which makes a difference [4]. Information is a difference that changes the state of a
system, i.e. creates another difference. As soon as several differences exist in a system,
a selective operation is necessary, i.e. a decision must be made. Following Whitehead’s
demand “that no arbitrary breaks may be introduced into nature” [29], panpsychism is
assuming that not only humans and animals, but also cells, bacteria and even electrons
have at least rudimentary mental properties. It is extremely difficult to draw a divid-
ing line between mentally gifted and mindless entities. Single-celled organisms such as
bacteria show unconscious intentionality due to their purposeful behaviour. According
to [26] research shows that even bees, rats and coyotes have a distinct mental inner life.
3 Information and Consciousness
This section discusses two information-based approaches to consciousness, which are
defined along the lines of panpsychism from the previous section. One is the informa-
tion integration theory of Tononi [28] and the other, the global workspace theory of
Baars [2], can be seen as an instance of Tononi’s theory.
Information Integration
Information integration theory of Tononi [28] avoids the necessity of a neurobiological
correlate of consciousness. It is applicable to arbitrary networks of information pro-
cessing units, they need not to be neural or biological. Tononi is proposing a thought
experiment: Assume you are facing a blank screen, which is alternatively on and off and
you are instructed to say “light” or “dark” according to the screen’s status. Of course a
simple photodiode can do exactly the same job, beep when the light is on and silence
when it is off. The difference between you and the photodiode is the so called “qualia”
— you consciously experience “seeing” light or dark. This is a partially subjective pro-
cess, a first-person feeling, which we are not able to measure or compare with that of
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other persons (a prominent treatment of this topic is in [22]). One difference between
you and the photo diode is, that the diode can switch between two different states, on
and off, exclusively whereas your brain enters one of an extremely large number of
states when it recorgnizes the light. But it is not just the difference in the number of
states, it is also important to take the degree of information integration into account.
If we use a megapixel camera instead of a single photodiode for differentiating light
from dark, this technical device would also enter one of a very large number of possible
states (representing all possible images it can store). According to Tononi the differ-
ence between you and the camera, is that the millions of pixels within the camera are
not connected to each other. Your brain, however, integrates information from various
parts of the brain. (For example it is hard to imagine colours without shapes.) Tononi
gives in [28] a formal definition of information integration by defining a function Φ,
which measures the capacity of a system to integrate information. To get an idea of this
approach, assume a network of elements which are connected, e.g. a neural network and
take a subset S from this system. Tononi ”wants to measure the information generated
when S enters a particular state out of its repertoire, but only to the extent that such in-
formation can be integrated, i.e. it can result from causal interactions within the system.
To do so, we partition S into A and its complement B . . . We then give maximum en-
tropy to the outputs from A, i.e. substitute its elements with independent noise sources
of constrained maximum variance. Finally, we determine the entropy of the resulting re-
sponses of B . . . ” [28]. Based on this computation he defines the effective information
between A and B, which is a measure of the information shared between the source A
and the target B. The above mentioned function Φ is defined with the help of the notion
of effective information. The entire system is then divided into several bipartitions in
order to find the ones with the highest Φ-value. These so-called complexes are respon-
sible for integration of information within the system. Tononi is considering them as
the ”subjects” of experience, being the locus where information can be integrated.
Based on this understanding of consciousness, one can try to test the theory by
considering several neuroanatomical or neurophysiological factors that are known to
influence consciousness of humans. Tononi is doing this in great detail in [28], others
are developing new Turing tests for AI systems based on this theory (e.g. [17]).
We will comment later on applying this information integration theory to an auto-
mated reasoning system.
In the following we will depict an another approach to consciousness, which can be
seen as a special case of the information integration theory, namely the global workspace
theory developed by B. Baars [2].
The Theater of Consciousness
One motivation for Baars global workspace theory (GWT) [2] is the observation, that
the human brain has a very limited working memory. We can actively manipulate about
seven separate things at the same time in our working memory. This is an astonishing
small number in contrast to the more than 100 billion neurons of the human brain.
Another limitation is that human consciousness is limited to only one single stream of
input. We can listen only to one speaker at a time, we cannot talk to a passenger during
driving in heavy traffic and there are many more examples like this. At the same time
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there are numerous processes running in parallel but unconsciously. GWT is using the
metaphor of a theater to model how consciousness enables us to handle the huge amount
of knowledge, memories and sensory input the brain is controlling at every moment.
GWT assumes a theater consisting of a stage, an attentional spotlight shining at the
stage, actors which represent the contents, an audience and some people behind the
scene. Let’s look at the parts in more detail:
The stage. The working memory consists of verbal and imagined items. Most parts
of the working memory are in the dark, but there are a few active items, usually the
short-term memory.
The spotlight of attention. This bright spotlight helps in guiding and navigating
through the working memory. Humans can shift it at will, by imagining things or events.
The actors The actors are the members of the working memory; they are competing
against each other to gain access to the spotlight of attention.
Context behind the scene. Behind the scenes, the director coordinates the show and
stage designers and make-up artists prepare the next scenes.
The audience. According to Baars, the audience represents the vast collection of
specialized knowledge. It can be considered as a kind of long-term memory and consists
of specialized properties, which are unconscious. Navigation through this part of the
knowledge is done mostly unconsciously.
It is important to note, that this model of consciousness, although it uses a theatre
metaphor, is very different from a model like the Cartesion theatre, as it it discussed
and refused in [10]. A Cartesian theater model would assume, that there is a certain
region within the brain, which is the location of consciousness, this would be a kind of
humunculus. In Baars theater, however, the entire brain is the theater and hence there
is no special location, it is the entire integrated structure which is conscious. This is
in very nice accordance with Tononis information integration theory, described above.
And indeed Baars and colleagues developed an architecture based on GWT, which they
call LIDA ”a comprehensive, conceptual and computational model covering a large por-
tion of human cognition” [1]. LIDA consists of a number of software modules, which
implement a cognitive cycle which is derived from the GWT. Baars gives a detailed
justification of LIDA by modeling aspects of human cognition within his model.
In the following we will follow a very different road — instead of designing a new
architecture based on GWT, we will show that an existing automated reasoning system
for first-order logic, namely the Hyper-System [6] as it is used within the CoRg —
Cognitive Reasoning project 1 [24] can be seen as an instance of GWT.
4 Automated Reasoning and GWT
In the CoRg project, we tackle commonsense reasoning benchmarks like the Choice of
Plausible Alternatives (COPA) Challenge [23] with the help of automated reasoning.
These problems require large amounts of background knowledge. Similar to common-
sense reasoning, the GWT assumes large amounts of background knowledge. There-
fore, the methods developed in the CoRg project are suitable for modelling of the GWT
1 http://corg.hs-harz.de
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by means of automated reasoning. In this section, we not only briefly depict an au-
tomated reasoning system but also comment on particular problems that arise if it is
applied in the context with large knowledge bases. In Subsection 4.2 we interpret the
system along the lines of Section 3 as a Baars’ theater and hence a model the GWT.
4.1 Reasoning with Large Knowledge Bases
Hyper is an automated theorem prover for first-order logic [6]. First-order theorem
proving is aiming at the following task: Given a set of formulae F and a conjecture
(sometimes called query) Q the question is, whether or not Q is a logical consequence
of F , written as F |= Q. For first-order logic formulae this is an undecidable problem,
but it is semi-decidable, meaning that if the logical consequence holds, the prover will
stop after finite time stating that it is a consequence. Hyper, like most of the high per-
formance provers today is a refutational prover, which means that the question whether
F |= Q holds, is transformed into the equivalent question asking if F ∪ ¬Q is unsatis-
fiable. Before trying to prove the unsatisfiability of F ∪¬Q, Hyper transforms F ∪¬Q
into a normal form, a so-called set of clauses. The Hyper prover is based on a tableau
calculus. The advantage of this is, that Hyper is manipulating one single proof-object,
the tableau, in order to demonstrate the unsatifiablity of the problem at hand. Figure 1
shows an example of a clause set belonging to a problem from the area of common-
sense reasoning together with its Hyper tableau. The tableau on the left part of Figure 1
is essentially a tree that was developed branch by branch using inference steps. An
inference step selects a branch and then tries to extend this branch by using a clause
from the clause set (right side of Figure 1) together with an inference rule specified by
the calculus. The technical aspect of the calculus on how to extend the tree in detail
are not important here. We want to point out, however, that at any stage of the con-
struction of a tree, a branch represents a (partial) interpretation of the given formulae.
E.g. the right-most branch in our example corresponds to the (partial) interpretation
{dog(a), bone(b), chew(c), on(c, b), agent(c, a),manducate(c), eat(c), animal(a),
carnivore(a), dog treat(b), dog food(b)}, The left branch of the tableau is closed,
since bone(b) and plant(b) (derived using clause (10) with X = a, Y = c and Z = b)
are contradictory according to clause (11). A proof is found if there is a tableau that con-
tains only closed branches. If no proof can be found, like in the example in Figure 1,
the open branches list literals that can be derived from the set of clauses.
Hyper has been used in many different application areas, reaching from commercial
knowledge based systems to intelligent book development [5]. Recently Hyper was
used as the main reasoning machinery in natural language query answering [11] and for
cognitive reasoning, in particular answering commonsense questions [13].
In all of these applications Hyper very rarely managed to find a proof within the
given constraints — in most cases there was a timeout and Hyper’s result was a branch
representing a partial interpretation of the formulae at hand.
Next, we will illustrate how to use Hyper used to draw inferences from a statement.
Since we aim at modeling the GWT, we assume the statement to be given in natural
language. In order to draw inferences from a natural language statement with the help of
an automated reasoning system, the problem has to be translated from natural language
to a formal language — in our case this is first-order logic. This translation is done in a
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dog(a)
bone(b)
chew(c)
on(c, b)
agent(c, a)
manducate(c)
eat(c)
animal(a)
herbivore(a)
plant(b)
⊥
carnivore(a)
dog treat(b)
dog food(b)
dog(a)← (1)
bone(b)← (2)
chew(c)← (3)
on(c, b)← (4)
agent(c, a)← (5)
manducate(X)← chew(X) (6)
eat(X)← manducate(X) (7)
animal(X)← dog(X) (8)
herbivore(X) ∨ carnivore(X)← animal(X) (9)
plant(Z)← herbivore(X) ∧manducate(Y )∧
agent(Y,X) ∧ on(Y,Z) (10)
⊥ ← plant(X) ∧ bone(X) (11)
dog treat(X)← bone(X) (12)
dog food(X)← dog treat(X) (13)
Fig. 1. Clauses on the right, hyper tableau for the clauses on the left. The left branch of the tableau
is closed, the right branch is open. The literals in the open branch constitute a partial interpretation
of the clause set.
fully automated system called KNEWS [3], which is based on the Boxer-System [3,9].
As a running example, we consider the following sentence, which is a part of one of the
problems in the COPA challenge:
The dog chewed on a bone.
The first-order logic translation we get using KNEWS is:
∃A(dog(A) ∧ ∃B,C(r1on(C,B) ∧ bone(B) ∧ r1agent(C,A) ∧ chew(C))). (14)
It is obvious that for reasoning with this formula knowledge about the world is
necessary; e.g. about food intake of dogs or about the composition of meat and bones.
This knowledge of course cannot be added by hand, it is necessary to use a knowledge
base, where many possible facts and relations about the world are available. If this
knowledge is not restricted to a single domain, if it is general enough to be used for
different areas it gets very large and hence difficult to handle. In the CoRg-project [24]
among other sources ConceptNet [27] is used as background knowledge. ConceptNet
is a semantic net structure with 1.6 million edges connecting more than 300,000 nodes.
Knowledge in ConceptNet is stored in the form of triples such as (dog, hasA, fur). To
allow the first-order logic reasoner Hyper to use ConceptNet as background knowledge,
we have translated most of the English part of ConceptNet to first-order logic. The
above triple has been translated into the following formula:
∀X(dog(X)→ ∃Y (hasA(X,Y ) ∧ fur(Y ))) (15)
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The resulting knowledge base consists of 2,927,402 axioms and is therefore far too
large to be completely processed by reasoners. Hence, it is necessary to select parts
of this huge knowledge base which might be relevant for the task at hand. Note, that
this situation is very different from a classical automated reasoning problem, where all
the necessary formulae to find a proof are given. They can be used all together by the
reasoning system, without the necessity to guess parts of it to be loaded into the system.
The left part of Figure 2 illustrates the situation in automated reasoning with large
knowledge bases. The logical representation (Formula (14)) of the natural language
sentence is depicted on the very left together with the knowledge base, ConceptNet,
in the middle of the figure. The task is to select those parts from the knowledge base
which might be helpful for reasoning about the logical representation. To this end there
are two selection methods sketched: The first one uses syntactic criteria exclusively for
the selection [15]. Depending on the symbols occurring within the logical representa-
tion those parts of the knowledge base are selected, which contain one of these symbols
(additionally this selection takes the number of occurrences of a symbol into account in
order to prevent that very frequent symbols like isA lead to the selection of the whole
knowledge base). The second method uses additionally semantic criteria for the selec-
tion. The semantics of a symbol is given by a word embedding, which is used to find
semantically similar symbols for the selection process. As a result not only formulae
containing the symbols dog, chew and bone are selected, but also those containing sim-
ilar symbols like for example manducate and remasticate. This method is described and
evaluated in detail in [12].
Figure 1 depicts an extract of the selected background knowledge for Formula (14)
on the right hand side: Clauses (6) - (13) correspond to selected background knowledge
for the symbols in Formula (14) and exemplary for the symbol manducate which is
similar to chew. Clauses (1) - (5) correspond to the clausification of Formula (14).
Even if much background knowledge is added, this background knowledge will
never be able to represent the complete human background knowledge and will al-
ways remain incomplete. Therefore automatic theorem provers can only rarely prove
inferences in natural language. For example, it would hardly be possible with an au-
tomatic theorem prover to prove that the statement The dog chewed on a bone implies
the statement The dog is content. This is because the second statement is not a logical
consequence of the first one. It is rather the case, that The dog is content is more likely
to be a a consequence than the statement The dog is injured. This kind of reasoning is
also called cognitive reasoning.
Therefore, we do not aim at the construction of proofs but rather to analyse the
inferences performed by Hyper after a certain amount of reasoning (see the green path
in the right part of Figure 2).
One of the main problems in the above depicted task, is the selection of appropriate
parts of knowledge. This is very much related to the approach of information integration
according to Tononi: Given a huge network, the knowledge base, and a problem, we
want to integrate all the necessary parts of the knowledge to solve the problem. Hence
the degree of consciousness of the entire system from Figure 2 could be determined (at
least in theory) by Tononis approach.
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Fig. 2. On the left: Syntactic selection uses symbols from the formula to select parts of the back-
ground knowlege, depicted with black arrows and regions. Similarity selection takes the meaning
of symbol names into account by additionally selecting formulae containing symbols which are
similar according to a word embedding (depicted by blue arrows and regions). On the right: A
snapshot during a Hyper run. The (green) path of the tree, Hyper is working on, corresponds to
the working memory. The knowledge base represents the long-time memory.4
4.2 Looking through the GWT-Glasses
In the previous subsection we briefly explained how the theorem prover Hyper is adapted
and used within the area of cognitive reasoning. We now show that Hyper in combina-
tion with large knowledge bases can be interpreted as an architecture that implements
the GWT as introduced in Section 3.
The stage. The working memory is the branch of the tree which currently is ex-
panded. In the right part of Figure 2 this is the green path of the tree — it contains the
context in which the next reasoning step will be performed.
The spotlight of attention. This bright spotlight selects and highlights those parts of
the (green) branch together with the formulae from the problem or the selected parts of
the knowledge base which are used for the next reasoning step.
The actors. The actors correspond to the application of inference rules on the set
of clauses currently processed by the theorem provers. The result of the actors’ actions
correspond to new formulae derived by an inference step.
Context behind the scene. Behind the scenes, the reasoner and its control act as a
director.
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Audience. According to Baars, the audience represents the vast collection of spe-
cialized knowledge. It can be considered as a kind of long-term memory, namely the
knowledge base.
Altogether we have a complete Baars’ theater of consciousness consisting of the
reasoner Hyper, together with its control and its background knowledge — we have a
system which can be interpreted as a conscious system according to the ideas presented
above. In the following section this will be deepened by discussing mind wandering.
5 Mind Wandering
Mind wandering is a process in which people do not stick to a single topic with their
thoughts, but move in chains of thoughts from one topic to the next. In doing this the
border between conscious and unconscious processing is continuously crossed, and in
both directions. Hence studying mind wandering certainly contributes to a better under-
standing of consciousness. Mind wandering often occurs in less demanding activities.
A study [16] shows that up to 40% of the time a human mind is wandering around.
Mind wandering also has interesting positive effects, which is investigated in [21]
where it was shown that mind wandering can be helpful in finding creative solutions to
a problem. In this section we show, that a control system of Hyper is very well able to
invoke mind wandering for Hyper. We will first give a rough overview of the system
and then go into details about the individual steps.
Overview of the System The mind wandering process is started from an initial for-
mula, such as Formula (14). In the first step, the system performs a semantic selection
as described in the previous section to select suitable background knowledge for this
formula. The formula together with the selected background knowledge is transferred
to Hyper, which performs inferences and returns a (possibly partial) interpretation. This
(possibly partial) interpretation corresponds to the green path of the tree in the right part
of Figure 2 and contains everything Hyper was able to derive within a given time limit.
Since the selected background knowledge is very broad, the interpretation also contains
very broad information. To find a focus, the symbols occurring in the interpretation are
clustered according to their word meaning and a cluster is selected as focus. This step
simulates the spotlight of attention of the GWT, which focuses on a certain area of the
stage. For the symbols in the focus, new background knowledge is selected and passed
to Hyper again together with the focus. Hyper again performs inferences. This process
is repeated until Hyper’s inferences no longer provide new information compared to the
previous round. A detailed description of the individual steps of the system follows.
The Audience – BackgroundKnowledge and Selection The selection from the knowl-
edge base starts with a set of symbols called the current context, which consists of the
symbols from a starting formula like for example Formula (14) and similar symbols.
4 Picture of network: [14], CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Visual-
ization of Word Embedding: Euskara: Hitz batzuen errepresentazioa by Aelu013, CC BY-SA
4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en) (word removed).
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Selecting all formulae from the knowledge base in which one of the context symbols
occurs results in a large set of formulae. Using all these formulae would be too unfo-
cused w.r.t. the considered formula, so a filtering step removes all formulae in which
other predicate symbols occurring in the formula are not within a certain range of sim-
ilarity to the symbols in the context. To measure similarity, cosine similarity in a word
embedding is used. The interval in which the similarity must fall for a formula to be
selected is passed to the system by two parameters. With the help of these parameters it
is possible to control how far the background knowledge is allowed to move away from
the context symbols. With a suitable interval it is possible to select a formula like (15)
while preventing to select a formula like
∀x(poodle(x)→ ∃y(relatedTo(x , y) ∧ dog(y))) (16)
Currently, the system can use either the ConceptNet Numberbatch [27] word embedding
or a word embedding learnt on personal stories from blog entries [23].
Actors and Context behind the Scene — Reasoning The selected set of formulae
together with Formula (14) is passed to the Hyper reasoner. Hyper is started with a
timeout of 30 seconds and calculates during this time a possibly partial interpretation
for the input formulae. This interpretation represents knowledge that can be inferred
from Hyper’s input. In the next step, the system analyses Hyper’s output. Since the input
formulae are still very broad despite the filter methods mentioned above, the (partial)
interpretation also contains a very broad knowledge inferred from Hyper’s input. First
the system extracts all predicate symbols from Hyper’s output and removes from this
set all symbols from the current context to prevent the mind wandering process from
getting stuck. Hyper’s model produced for the running example contains 122 predicate
symbols which are thematically widely spread: from ears, skin, flesh, wolf, calcium,
animal, collar and vertebrate to woof and barking, many terms are represented.
Spotlight of Attention — Finding a Focus To determine a focus in the multitude of
these terms, the system performs a clustering on these terms using KMeans and the
cosine similarity of a word embedding as similarity measure. Currently, the number of
clusters created corresponds to the number of predicate symbols in the (partial) inter-
pretation divided by 4. In future work, different values for the number of clusters will
be considered. Next, the system orders the resulting clusters by their cosine similarity to
the predicate symbols in the current context and chooses one of the clusters as the focus.
For the experiments, the cluster in the middle of the sorted sequence is chosen as the
focus in order to allow the mind wandering process to move away from the current con-
text. In the running example, this led to selecting the cluster consisting of the symbols
animal and animals as the new focus. Other choices for the focus cluster are possible
and can be selected with the help of a parameter. Next, the system creates a simple for-
mula from the symbols in the focus cluster and selects suitable background knowledge
as described above. In this selection, the symbols from the focus cluster together with
similar symbols are used as new context symbols. The described process is repeated a
desired number of times or until the process does not deliver any new symbols.
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65: The family took their dog to the veterinarian. What was the CAUSE of this?
1. The dog chewed on a bone.
2. The dog injured his paw.
Fig. 3. Example problem 65 from the COPA challenge.
Experimental Results Starting from the symbols in the initial formula, the symbols in
the selected focus clusters represent the result of the mind wandering process. Starting
from Formula (14) containing the symbols dog, chew and bone the described system
provides for example the following sequence of sets of focus symbols:
{animal, animals} → {gardening} →
{garden, horticulture, farming} → {mowing, lawn, yard} →
{outside, front, outdoor} → {weather} →
{thunder, lightning} → {cloud, sky, clouds} → {water}
This corresponds to a mind wandering chain which focuses on animals leads to garden-
ing and finally addresses weather aspects which leads to water.
It should be noted that the system has many parameters to control this mind wander-
ing process. For the experiments, different parameter combinations were automatically
tried out and the sequences of focus symbols generated in this way were manually in-
spected. Different parameter values led to a different chain which finally ends at fashion:
{furry, tail, fur} → {coats, wool, coat} → {fur} →
{animal, pet, hair, coat, pelt, wool} →
{sleeves, robe, braided, leather, fur, garment, buttoned, styled, pockets, strand, woven,
cloth, wearable} →
{coats, covering, pattern, textile, fastened, worn, wool, coat, material, pelt}→ {wearing,
robe, suit, shirt}
The presented experiments are only a first feasibility study. For future work the
application of mindwandering in the commonsense reasoning area is planned.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we tried to connect work from research on consciousness with work on
formal reasoning. We depicted an implementation of a mind wandering process within
a logical reasoning system, which can be interpreted as the action of a consciously
reasoning system. Further work has to be done for finding a way to determine what
knowledge is interesting enough to be kept within the focus of the system and how
the knowledge base should be modified according to the results of mind wandering.
Currently, only one path of the proof tree is considered for the mind wandering process.
In future work we plan to extend the approach to consider multiple open branches for
mind wandering.
Furthermore, we plan the application of mindwandering in the commonsense rea-
soning area, where we will consider commonsense reasoning benchmarks like the COPA
Challenge. Figure 3 shows an example from the COPA Challenge. A first idea for the so-
lution of these benchmarks would be to start a mindwandering process for both answer
candidates and to choose the answer where the result of the mindwandering process is
closer to the problem description The family took their dog to the veterinarian.
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